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We investigates the link between fragility and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa over a 
yearly panel including 28 countries for the 1999-2004 period. Beside the conventional definition of 
fragility adopted by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, we introduce the more severe 
definition of extreme fragility. We show that only the latter exerts a significantly negative impact on 
economic development, once standard economic, demographic, and institutional regressors are 
accounted for. As a by-product of this investigation we produce up-to-date evidence on the growth 
performance of the area. We find a tendency to convergence and no influence of geographic and 
historical factors.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of state fragility (from now on, fragility) has recently reached center stage in the debate 
on economic development, and in particular on the development prospects of sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). The concept of fragility has been associated with various combinations of the following 
dysfunctions: inability to provide basic services and meet vital needs, unstable and weak 
governance, a persistent condition of extreme poverty, lack of territorial control, and high 
propensity to conflict and civil war. The crucial relevance of fragility for SSA countries is 
motivated by the fact that they are overrepresented among fragile states, with drastic consequences 
on the eligibility of the area to substantial aid flows.  
 
Several studies have examined the influence of the condition of fragility on development, either 
through its direct impact on income and growth, or through its indirect influence through aid 
allocation. Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) finds that within SSA the impact of fragility on per capita 
income interacts with several other factors: in fragile countries, beyond a threshold level trade 
openness may actually be harmful to income, while small improvements in political institutions can 
have adverse effects. Fosu (2009) finds that the absence of policy syndromes encourages growth in 
Africa, but only one component of the syndromes he considers, state breakdown, has to do with 
fragility. Burnside and Dollar (2000) provide evidence that aid is most effective in developing 
countries with sound institutions and policies, even if this conclusion is challenged by Hansen and 
Tarp (2001) and Dalgaard et al. (2004). McGillivray e Feeny (2008) study the growth impact of aid  
for a world sample of fragile countries and find that it depends on the relative degree of fragility. 
Chauvet e Collier (2007) analyze the preconditions for sustained policy turnarounds in failing states 
and show that financial aid can be less effective than aid through technical assistance. Overall, a 
clear impact of fragility on economic outcomes has proved hard to assess, partly because of the 
different definitions employed.    3
 
The purpose of the present paper is to experiment with alternative definitions of fragility, in order to 
assess the usefuless of the fragility criterion for forecasting growth and allocating aid. We shall 
focus our attention on SSA, for two reasons. The first reason is that as previously explained this 
issue is particularly important for policy intervention in this region. The second reason is that 
fragility has proven such a multi-faceted condition that to concentrate on a specific, relatively 
homogeneous area may lead to more meaningful conclusions. At the same time, it is recognized 
that, especially within SSA, fragile states are sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of their economic, 
social, geographic and political characteristics. The European Report on Development (2009), 
which is entirely devoted to the problem of fragility in Africa, assembles a full array of stylized 
facts that confirms this heterogeneity.  
 
The variables which we include in our investigation, as potentially relevant for Africa’s growth 
prospects,  are chosen among those which have been found relevant within the literature. We 
specifically draw on the variables selected by Bertocchi and Canova (2002) to investigate the 
impact of colonization on growth in Africa. We therefore include, first of all, an initial condition for 
per capita income, followed by a wide range of economic, demographic, geographic and istitutional 
regressors. Among economic factors, we consider investment, schooling, government expenditures, 
trade openness, and inflation. We also introduce demographic factors, namely, life expectancy and 
the fertility rate, as well as the index of ethnic fractionalization. We capture the quality of 
institutions, with the index of civil liberties. To these variables we add two alternative definitions of 
fragility, both based on the the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings 
developed by the World Bank. The ratings represent the basis of the aid allocation algorithm 
applied by the International Development Association (IDA) through a specific formula. IDA is the 
part of the World Bank that helps the world’s poorest countries. Established in 1960, IDA aims to 
reduce poverty by providing interest-free credits and grants. It currently represents one of the   4
largest sources of assistance for the world’s 79 poorest countries, 39 of which are in Africa.  
 
On the basis of the distribution of CPIA ratings, we construct two alternative definitions of fragility, 
of increasing intensity. The first applies when a country belongs to the bottom two quintiles of the 
CPIA ratings, or if is unrated. Since this definition coincides with the one employed by the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), we denote it as DAC fragility. We denote instead as 
extreme fragility the condition under which a country belongs to the bottom quintile of the CPIA 
ratings, or if it is unrated. We construct a yearly panel dataset including those 28 SSA countries for 
which we have information on the distribution by quintiles of CPIA ratings over the 1999-2007 
period and we perform growth regression analysis adding the two alternative definitions of fragility, 
one by one, to the standard regressors employed in the growth literature. 
 
Our results can be summarized as follows. DAC fragility, i.e, the conventional measure of fragility, 
shows an insignificant impact on economic development, once standard regressors are accounted 
for.  However, when we apply the more severe definition of extreme fragility, we find a clear, 
negative impact of this condition. This result holds in a pooled OLS specification and is robust to 
panel estimates exploiting the temporal dimension of the data set, as well as to 2SLS estimates 
controlling for the potential endogeneity of both measures of fragility. This result carries powerful 
policy implications, since it implies that countries commonly classified as fragile do not show 
worse performances than non fragiles ones. 
 
As a by-product of our investigation, we also obtain up-to-date estimates of the determinants of 
growth in SSA during the half decade running from 1999 to 2004. First of all, we find evidence of 
convergence. Moreover, our OLS estimates show that economic development is facilitated by 
schooling, government expenditures, and life expectancy, while it is retarded by inflation and  by 
ethnic fractionalization. The impact of civil liberties displays  a convex behavior suggesting that   5
economic development is faster under extreme values of the index, i.e., under extreme autocracies 
and under very liberal democracies. We do not find any additional explicatory value either for 
geographic variables such as latitude and sea access, or for colonial variables such as the national 
identity of the colonizers or settler mortality. These findings are broadly in line with standard 
predictions from growth theory, suggesting that the sources of underdevelopment in SSA are not 
specific to this region.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports the definitions of fragility and 
describes our dataset. Section 3 presents our empirical findings. Section 4 concludes and suggests 




The concept of fragility is an elusive one. It has been defined in several different manners by 
various international organizations. For example, the United Kingdom Department for International 
Development defines fragile states as those where the government cannot or will not deliver core 
functions to its people. According to the World Bank, fragile states are defined as low-income 
countries scoring 3.2 and below (over a 1-6 range) on the CPIA. The OECD-DAC defines as fragile 
states those countries in the bottom two CPIA quintiles, as well as those which are not rated.
1  Since 
CPIA ratings are publicly available only since 2005, for the purposes of our empirical investigation 
we use the OECD-DAC information about the distribution of IDA member countries by CPIA 
quintiles, which is available from 1999 until 2007. On the basis of this information, we adopt two 
                                                 
1 Other related indexes are the Failed State Index, the  Index of State Weakness, the indicator of 
Failed & Fragile States, and the Fragility States Index, respectively published by the Fund for 
Peace, the Brookings Institution, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, and Polity IV. 
   6
alternative definitions of fragility. The first coincides with the one proposed by OECD-DAC, so that 
we label it DAC fragility. The second, which we label extreme fragility, includes those countries in 
the bottom CPIA quintile, as well as those which are not rated. 
 
CPIA ratings are prepared annually by World Bank staff and are intended to capture the quality of a 
country’s policies and institutional arrangements, with a focus on the key elements that are within 
the country’s control, rather than on outcomes (such as growth rates) that are influenced by 
elements outside the country’s control.  Scores are assigned on the basis of 16 criteria (20 until 
2003) which are grouped in four equally weighted clusters:  Economic Management, Structural 
Policies, Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity, and Public Sector Management and Institutions. 
The ratings reflect a variety of indicators, observations, and judgments based on country 
knowledge, originated in the Bank or elsewhere, and on relevant publicly available indicators.  
 
For our purposes, to refer to the CPIA ratings offers three advantages. First, the ratings have a 
crucial practical relevance, since they significantly influence the Bank’s concessional lending and 
grants allocated through IDA. Second, information on their distribution by quintiles is now   
available for a relatively extended time period, i.e., from 1999 to 2007. Third, because of their 
design, they do not reflect mechanically any of the other variables that enter our regressions.  
 
We construct a yearly panel dataset including those 28 SSA countries for which we have 
information on CPIA ratings over the 1999-2007 period. Our dependent variable is real per capita 
GDP (in log) which, however, is only available until 2004. To capture alternative definitions of 
fragility, we construct two dummy variables, one for DAC fragility and the other for extreme 
fragility. The first takes value 1 is a country belongs to the bottom two CPIA quintiles (or is 
unrated), 0 otherwise. The second takes value 1 is a country belongs to the bottom  CPIA quintile 
(or is unrated), 0 otherwise. Among standard regressors, we include economic variables, namely   7
investment, schooling, government expenditures, trade openness, and inflation. We also introduce 
demographic factors, such as life expectancy and the fertility rate, as well as the index of ethnic 
fractionalization. To capture the quality of institutions, we select the civil liberties index. To be 
noticed is that the index is contructed in such a way that a higher value is associated with fewer 
civil liberties. More details on the variables employed are available in the Data Appendix. 
 
Table. 1.  Summary statistics 
 
Variable    Obs.   Mean  Median Min  Max  Standard 
deviation
pc GDP (log)  149  7,30  7,02  5,82  9,74  0,94 
DAC  fragility  216  0,45  0,00  0,00 1,00 0,50 
Extreme  fragility  216  0,31  0,00  0,00 1,00 0,46 
Investment  149  8,34 7,60 0,15 26,84 4,70 
Schooling  252  3,50 1,55 0,10 30,30 5,76 
Government expenditures  149  21,53  19,04  2,12  61,43  11,51 
Trade 149  68,53  59,96  4,83  171,93  35,36 
Inflation 251  62,28  6,08  -3,66  10452,60  663,91 
Life expectancy  224  49,95  48,85  36,04  73,17  7,40 
Fertility rate (log)  224  1,61  1,67  0,65  2,03  0,30 
Ethnic  fractionalization  252  0,68  0,73  0,06 0,93 0,21 
Civil  liberties  252  4,04  4,00  1,00 7,00 1,39 
       Notes: Panel dataset 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in our dataset. The (unreported) pairwise 
correlation between the two alternative definitions of fragility is 0,66. Moreover, extreme fragility 
shows a much higher negative correlation with  per capita income, if compared with DAC fragility, 




For a panel dataset, the general analog of a standard Barro (1991) cross section growth regression 
is given by  
   8
(1) log yi,t = (1+β) log yi,t-1 + γ Xi,t  + φ Fi,t + ci + τt + vit          
 
where yi,t is per capita real GDP, yi,t-1 is its lagged value, Xi,t  is a vector including a constant and 
standard regressors, Fi,t is the appropriate fragility dummy, and vit is the error term. To the above 
specification, one can add a full set of dummies capturing country-specific effects, ci, as well as a 
full set of dummies capturing time-specific effects, τt. To be noticed is that to regress current output 
on lagged output implies a different interpretation of the coefficient of the latter, which however 
can be written as (1+β), where β has the conventional interpretation in terms of convergence. 
 
As explained by Durlauf et al. (2005), the obvious advantage of a panel dataset in empirical growth 
research is that the constraints given by the limited number of countries available can be overcome 
by using the within-country time variation, with the effect of multiplying the number of 
observations. This consideration becomes especially important since  we focus our attention on a 
specific area, rather than on a world sample. In the following investigation, however, we are not 
able to fully exploit the potential of dynamic panel models. In particular, using country fixed effects 
is prevented by the structure of our sample, with as many as 28 countries against only five years, 
which would imply a serious loss of degrees of freedom and the danger of multicollinearity. 
Likewise, random country effects are also precluded by the requirement that the country effects 
have to be distributed independently of the explanatory variables. This requirement is clearly 
violated for a dynamic panel by construction, given the dependence of log yi,t  on the country-
specific effects on the right-hand side. Therefore, we initially perform pooled OLS estimation, only 
to add yearly time-specific effects in a subsequent specification.
2   
                                                 
2
   It follows that, without fixed effects, the interpretation of the convergence results obtained in 
pooled regressions remain very similar to those in traditional cross section regressions. See Islam 
(1995).      9
Table 2. Pooled OLS estimates. Dependent variable is  pc GDP (log) 
 
Regressor  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant  0,4715**    
(0,2070) 
0,6477**     
(0,2841) 
1,0632***   
(0,2735) 
0,4898**     
(0,1959) 
0,6341**    
(0,2779) 
1,0908***    
(0,2794) 
Lagged pc GDP 
(log) 
0,9763***   
(0,0148) 
0,9572***    
(0,0250) 
0,9216***   
(0,0227) 
0,9751***    
(0,0144) 
0,9561***   
(0,0254) 








-0,0021   
(0,0018) 
-0,0029   
(0,0030) 
-0,0029   
(0,0025) 














0,0016***   
(0,0004) 
0,0019***   
(0,0006) 
0,0017*   
(0,0009) 
0,0015***   
(0,0003) 
0,0018***   
(0,0006) 
0,0016*   
(0,0009) 






































-0,0458   
(0,0431) 
-0,0976    
(0,0634) 
-0,1766***   
(0,0661) 
-0,0498    
(0,0433) 
-0,0949    
(0,0680) 




-0,0568*    
(0,0332) 
-0,0521    
(0,0490 ) 




-0,0525   
(0,0475) 
-0,0291    
(0,0328) 
Civil liberties  -0,0560**    
(0,0282) 
-0,0595**    
(0,0287) 
-0,0658**    
(0,0289) 
-0,0583**    
(0,0272) 
-0,0583**    
(0,0248) 




0,0061*   
(0,0036) 
0,0065*   
(0,0034) 




0,0063**   
(0,0029) 
0,0085***   
(0,0030) 
DAC fragility    -0,0104 
(0,0125) 





    -0,0765***   
(0,0210) 
   -0,0787***    
(0,0206) 
Time effects  no no no yes  yes  yes 
Adjusted R
2 0,99  0,97 0,97 0,99 0,97 0,97 
Observations  121 101 101 121 101 101 
         Notes: Panet dataset. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,                   
*** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Results are presented in Table 2.  In column 1 we start wth a pooled OLS specification including 
only standard regressors. Even before we move to the discussion of the impact of fragility with the 
next two columns, a few comments are in order since this regression offers an up-to-date 
perspective on SSA growth performances. First of all, we find evidence of convergence, with an 
implied β coefficient of 0.037.
  Given the presence of the lagged value of the dependent variable on 
the right-hand side, the adjusted R
2 of the regression is clearly very high, as expected. The inclusion   10
of the same regressor is a possible explanation of the insignificant impact of investment. Schooling 
has a positive  coefficient,  and so has government expenditures, while inflation appears to be 
detrimental for growth. Life expectancy is positively associated with growth, while ethnic 
fractionalization is not, as suggested by Easterly and Levine (1997). The impact of civil liberties is 
positive but the significance of its squared value suggests a convex behavior, which implies that 
economic development is facilitated under extreme values of the index, i.e., under extreme 
autocracies and under very liberal democracies. It follows that, under the former type of regime, a 
gradual improvement can be detrimental for growth. In an unreported variant of the same regression 
we also include two geographic variables, namely latitude and a dummy for being landlocked (see 
Sachs and Warner, 1997), but they do not add any explicatory power once the other factors are 
accounted for. These findings are broadly in line with standard predictions from growth theory, 
suggesting that the sources of underdevelopment in SSA are not specific to this region.  
 
In column 2 we add to the previous specification our DAC fragility dummy, which turns out to be 
insignificant. The other coefficients are substantially unvaried, expect for a reduced significance of 
schooling and life expectancy. In column 3, we insert our extreme fragility dummy and find that it 
exerts a very significantly negative impact on economic performances. This impact appears to be 
running through several channels, since its presence interferes with government expenditures, 
whose significance is reduced, and also with the fertility rate, which now emerges as a significant 
growth factor. We explore these channels further by interacting each of the two measures of 
fragility with government expenditures and fertility, but no significant pattern emerges, so that we 
do not report these extensions.
3 
 
In columns 4-6 we repeat the same set of regressions by adding a full set of time dummies. As 
confirmed by inspection of the significance of the dummies, which is generally modest, the 
                                                 
3 Guerzoni (2009) investigates a full set of interactions between fragility and the main regressors.    11
previous results can be confirmed: once again DAC fragility does not matter for growth, while 
extreme fragility does. 
 
                              Table 3. 2SLS estimates. Dependent variable is  pc GDP (log) 
 
Regressor  1 2 
Constant  0,2895     
(0,4087) 
0,6871**     
(0,3210) 








4,5473e-06   
(0,0022) 
Schooling 0,0042   
(0,0048) 




-0,0011   
(0,0012) 
-0,0007   
(0,0009) 
Trade -0,0002   
(0,0005) 






Life expectancy  0,0001 
(0,0021) 
-0,0004   
(0,0018) 
Fertility rate (log)  -0,0158   
(0,0603) 




-0,0749    
(0,0543) 
-0,0680     
(0,0500) 
Civil liberties  -0,0088   
(0,0541) 








DAC fragility  -0,0378   
(0,0285) 
 
Extreme fragility    -0,0697*** 
(0,0221) 
Adjusted R
2 0,97  0,97 
Observations 77  77 
Notes: Panet dataset. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The instruments are the lagged values of 
all regressors. * significant at 10%,** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
The findings presented so far need to be taken with caution, since our investigation may be plagued 
by endogeneity. Indeed, while it may be the case that fragility affects economic performances, it is   12
also conceivable that causality runs the other way.
4 Reverse causality may in fact affect all the other 
variables we employ as regressors. To address this issue, following Acemoglu et al. (2001) we  
exploit colonial history as a source of possible instruments for fragility. There is in fact a shared 
perception that fragility, as well as other dysfuntions such as corruption and ethnic conflict, might 
find their roots in the legacy of colonization. The European Development Report (2009) supports 
this perception by stressing the shared characteristics of state formation in this region: its artificial 
character following decolonization, the extractive nature of colonial domination, the political and 
economic dependence from the metropolitan power,  and the system of indirect rule. Acemoglu et 
al. (2001) develop a theory of institutional development which emphasizes the environmental 
conditions in the colonies, and in particular settler mortality, as the fundamental cause of 
subsequent economic performances. Thus settler mortality is employed as an instrument for current 
institutions, as measured by the risk of expropriation, in the effort to explain how institutions affect 
income. This approach is closely related to Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), who link institutions to 
factor endowments. Following this lead, we try to instrument both our fragility dummies with 
settler mortality. However, this avenue is impeded by the fact that in both cases settler mortality 
proves to be a very weak instrument, as revealed by the (unreported) first stages of  2SLS 
regressions we run. This outcome can to be attributed to the fact that, within the limited SSA 
sample we focus on, there is insufficient cross country variation along the environmental 
dimension.  
 
An alternative solution for the endogeneity problem is to employ as instruments the lagged values 
of the regressors. The rationale is simply that this procedures at least ensures that the values of the 
                                                 
4 Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010) investigate the determinants of fragility, by explicitly taking into 
account its potential endogeneity with respect to other relevant economic and non-economic factors, 
and find that institutions are the main determinants of fragility.    13
regressors are determined prior to those of the dependent variable. Since all regressors are 
potentially endogenous, we apply this instrumentation strategy to all of them. The results that we 
present in Table 3, for two specifications involving each of the two fragility dummies, need to be 
taken with caution, if anything because of the drastic reduction of the number of observations 
involved. Concerning the role of standard regressors, we find that only lagged per capita income 
and inflation, plus fertility in the second column, survive the endogeneity test. What is striking, 
however, is that extreme fragility retains its full explicatory power, which once again confirms its 
ability to capture a robust impact on economic performances.   
 
Finally, in an additional set of regressions which we do not report for brevity, we also try to gauge 
the potential relevance of colonial history along an alternative dimension. Following Bertocchi and 
Canova (2002), we evaluate the impact of different colonization regimes, as captured by the 
national identities of the colonizers. This exercise applies an intuition developed within another 
strand of the literature on colonial influence, which has stressed the identity of the colonizers, rather 
than the conditions in the colonies as in Acemoglu et al. (2001). La Porta et al. (1998) have focused 
on the legal systems inherited by the colonies, while Hall and Jones (1999) have studied the 
consequences of the extent to which the primary languages of Western Europe are spoken as first 
languages today. Together with Landes (1998) and North et al. (1998),  these contributions tend to 
agree on the conclusion that former British colonies have superior growth performances if 
compared to the former colonies of other countries. More specifically, Bertocchi and Canova (2002) 
find that this is the case over a sample of African countries from independence to 1988. However, 
when we add to our regressions, one by one, a set of dummy variables capturing the national 
identity of the colonizers, namely Britain, France, or Portugal, we find that their coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero.  Interactions between these variables and fragility prove equally 
insignificant. This suggests that the lasting influence of the colonial era may finally have faded 
during the period under our investigation and that fragility does not work through this legacy.    14
 
To conclude, we can compare our results regarding the impact of different degrees of fragility with 
those by McGillivray and Feeny (2008), who investigate the effectiveness of aid on growth and 
distinguish between different degrees of fragility on the basis of the same criterion we employ in 
this paper, i.e., on the distribution of countries by CPIA quintiles. They find that, for countries that  
belong to the bottom CPIA quintile,  there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between aid and 
growth, which can be attributed to absorptive capacity constraints. Therefore, beyond certain levels 
of inflows, aid can become detrimental to growth, but this conclusion emerges only in the case of 
highly fragile countries, confirming the relevance of the classification we employ. To refine the 
definition of fragility is also the scope of Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2008),  who question 
the conventional classification and develop a fuzzy transformation of the CPIA ratings. 
 
3.  Conclusion  
 
With a focus on SSA, we have explored the contribution of different degrees of fragility to 
economic growth, after controlling for a wide range of standard regressors. Besides economic, 
demographic, and institutional determinants, we have  also considered the unique role of the history 
and geopraphy of the area. Our estimates of the determinants of growth on SSA confirm the broad 
predictions from growth theory. Over the 1999-2004 period, we find evidence of convergence. 
Moreover, our OLS estimates show that faster economic development is associated with schooling, 
government expenditures, and life expectancy, while it is hampered by inflation,  ethnic 
fractionalization, and intermediate levels of civil liberties. Geography and colonial history do not 
seem to matter.  
 
Our main results concern the potential role of fragility. We have found that the conventional 
measure employed by the OECD-DAC exerts an insignificant impact on economic development,   15
once standard regressors are accounted for. However, when we apply the more severe definition of 
extreme fragility, we have found a clear, negative impact of this condition. These findings carry 
powerful policy implications, since that suggest that countries commonly classified as fragile do not 
show worse performances than non fragiles ones. 
 
How can we interpret these findings, especially in light of their potential implications for aid 
allocation? On the one hand, to find that extremely fragile countries have significantly worse 
prospects than mildly fragile ones confirms the concern, among international organizations, that aid 
may be waisted under these conditions. On the other, the rosier performances of countries which are 
not at the bottom of the aid distribution mechanism may indeed be due to aid itself, and not to their 
independent dynamism. This suggests a potential reverse causation between the criteria on which 
aid allocation is based and aid inflows themselves, which questions the widely accepted policy-
based conditionality criteria. While the literature we surveyed is purely empirical, its lack of 
robustness calls for an appropriate theoretical model that clarifies the channel at work. This is in our 
agenda for future research.  
   16
REFERENCES 
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review 91, 1369-1401. 
 
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., Wacziarg, R., 2003. Fractionalization. 
Journal of Economic Growth 8, 155-194. 
 
Baliamoune-Lutz, M., 2009. Institutions, Trade, and Social Cohesion in Fragile States: Implications 
for Policy Conditionality and Aid Allocation. Journal of Policy Modeling 31, 877-890.  
 
Baliamoune-Lutz, M., McGillivray, M., 2008. State Fragility: Concept and Measurement. UNU-
WIDER Research Paper No. 2008/44. 
 
Barro, R. J., 1991. Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106, 407-444. 
 
Barro, R. J., Lee, J., 2001. International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications. 
Oxford Economic Papers 53, 541-563. 
 
Bertocchi, G., Guerzoni, A., 2010, Growth, History or Institutions? What Explains State Fragility in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Mimeo. University of Modena. 
 
Bertocchi, G., Canova, F., 2001. Did Colonization Matter for Growth? An Empirical Exploration 
into the Historical Causes of Africa’s Underdevelopment. European Economic Review 46, 1851-
1871.   17
 
Burnside, C., Dollar, D., 2000. Aid, Policies and Growth. American Economic Review 90, 847-868. 
 
Chauvet, L., Collier, P., 2007. What are the Preconditions for Turnarounds in Failing States? 
Journal of Peace and Conflict Management, forthcoming. 
 
Carl-Johan Dalgaard, C., Hansen, H., Tarp, F.,  2004. On The Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth.  
Economic Journal 114, F191-F216.  
 
Durlauf, S. N., Johnson, P. A., Temple, J. R. W., 2005. Growth Econometrics. In P. Aghion, P., 
Durlauf, S. N. (Eds.). Handbook of Economic Growth, Volume 1A. North-Holland. Amsterdam. 
555-677. 
 
Easterly, W., Levine, R., 1997. Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 112, 1203-1250. 
 
Engerman, S. L.,  Sokoloff, K. L., 1997. Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of 
Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States. In  
Harber, S. (Ed.). How Latin America Fell Behind. Stanford University Press. Stanford, CA. 260-
304. 
 
European Report on Development (ERD), 2009. Overcoming Fragility in Africa. Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies. European University Institute. San Domenico di Fiesole. 
 
Fosu, A. K., 2009. Understanding the African Growth Record: The Importance of Policy   
Syndromes and Governance. UNU-WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2009/02.    18
 
Guerzoni, A., 2009. Fragility and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Master’s Thesis, 
University of Modena.   
 
Hall, R. E., Jones, C. I., 1999. Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker 
Than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114,  83-116. 
 
Hansen, H., Tarp, F., 2001. Aid and Growth Regressions. Journal of Development Economics 64, 
547–570. 
 
Islam, N., 1995. Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110,  
1127-70. 
 
Landes, D. S., 1998. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So 
Poor. W. W. Norton & Co.. New York, NY.  
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of 
Political Economy 106, 1113-1155. 
 
McGillivray, M., Feeny, S., 2008. Aid and Growth in Fragile States. UNU-WIDER Research Paper 
No. 2008/3. 
 
North, D. C., Summerhill, W., Weingast, B., 2000. Order, Disorder and Economic Change: Latin 
America vs. North America. In  Bueno de Mesquita, B., Root, H. (Eds.). Governing  for Prosperity.  
Yale University Press. New Haven, CT. 17-58. 
   19
Sachs, J. D., Warner, A. M., 1997. Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies. Journal of 
African Economies 6, 335-376.   20
DATA APPENDIX  
 
 
Variable Description    Source 
pc GDP  Real per capita GDP 
Penn World Table 6.2 
 
DAC fragility 
Binary variable assuming value 1 for 
countries in the bottom two CPIA 
quintiles or without a CPIA rating, 0 
otherwise 




Binary variable assuming value 1 for 
countries in the bottom CPIA 
quintile or without a CPIA rating, 0 
otherwise 
World Bank and Baliamoune-Lutz 
(2009) 
 
Investment  Investment over  real GDP  Penn World Table 6.2 
Schooling 
Secondary school attainment over 
official school age population of age 
15 and over.  
Center for International 





Government expenditures over real 
GDP 




Sum of import and export over real 
GDP  
Penn World Table 6.2 
Inflation Consumer  price  index  International Monetary Fund  
Life expectancy  Number of years of life expectancy 
at birth  
Cross-National Time Series (2001) 
Fertility rate  Number of children per woman  World Bank World Development 
Indicators (2008) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization  Ethnic fractionalization index   Alesina et al. (2003) 
Civil liberties  Civil liberties index  Freedom House (2008) 
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